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Conflicting State and Local Laws
Under what circumstances may a municipality pass regulations on a
subject already covered by state legislation? A late pronouncement on
the question by the Supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts' holds that
a municipal ordinance penalizing the use of pinball machines is invalid
where there is in effect a state statute regulating gambling, although
the statute itself does not specifically refer to this form of gaming.2
Gambling, the court reasoned, had long been exclusively controlled by
statewide legislation in Massachusetts and the state statute, designed to
eliminate the evil of gambling, was meant to occupy the entire legisla-
tive field. Therefore, the ordinance must be construed as being in excess
of the legislative power delegated to municipalities and void.3
The problem of conflicting state and local regulations in its larger
aspect is but one phase of the question of the extent of the right of local
self government. The municipality has generally been considered to be
the creature and organ of the state government creating it so that the
extent of its powers is dependent on those granted by that government.4
However, an early Michigan case5 created some popularity for the
theory that there also exists an inherent right to local self government
so that the powers of the municipalities were inherent and not solely
those delegated by the state. Although this theory found some support
among several writers in the field, 6 it has been almost universally
rejected by the courts7 with the result today that they are in sub-
stantial agreement on the proposition that local governments are solely
an organ of the state and their powers are only those delegated by it.
As a result, the states have taken steps to give their municipalities vary-
ing degrees of legislative power. The most common of these steps is the
so-called "Home Rule Amendment" which gives the various municipali-
ties autonomy in regulating their internal affairs. Under this amendment
it is generally recognized that municipal regulation of purely local
1 Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 319 Mass. 291, 65 N.E. (2d) 552 (1946).
2 Mass G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 271 §3.
3 Mass G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40 §21(1) authorizes towns to pass ordinances "for
directing and managing their prudential affairs, preserving peace and good order
and maintaining their internal police."
4 See 1 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) §145; 1 Dillon, Mlunici-
pal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) §98 reads, "It must now be conceded that the
great weight of legislative authority denies in toto the existence, in the absence of
a special constitutional provision, of any inherent right of local self government
which is beyond legislative control."
5 Cooley, J., in People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
6 1 McQuillen, op. cyMt. supra, note 4, §§265-6; 1 Dillon, op. cit. supra, note 4, §99.
7 1 Dillon, op. cit. supra, note 4, §98; McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right
of Local Self Government (1916) 16 Col. L. Rev. 190, 299.
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matters is valid and independent of any conflicting state legislation, but
municipal regulation of matters of general or statewide interest is
subordinate to state legislation on the same subject s and the ordinances
are void if they "conflict" with this legislation. Thus, a proper analysis
in any given case would involve a determination of (1) the exact extent
of the power delegated to the local government, (2) whether the matter
is a subject of purely local or statewide interest,9 and (3) whether or
not the municipal regulation conflicts with any state legislation on the
subject. The heart of the problem is usually found in the situation
where the last named factor is the decisive issue ;1o that is, where the dele-
gation of power to the municipality has been adequate and the subject
is not a matter of purely local concern, but the remaining question to
be decided is whether the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.
Inasmuch as this problem is strictly internal with each state and
involves interpreting and giving effect to individual state statutes, it
is not surprising that there is no general agreement on the exact mean-
ing of the term "conflict"." The cases, seemingly in hopeless confu-
sion, can be segregated for purposes of analysis into two general classes:
those that apply a liberal interpretation of the term allowing municipal
ordinances to stand in all cases except where the difference is irrec-
oncilable, and those applying a strict interpretation which strikes
ordinances down where there is a discernable variation from the statute.
Thus, a recent California decision'1 upheld an ordinance which pro-
hibited the carrying of dangerous weapons although the state statute
regulating firearms did not so limit their use. The variation between
the statute and the ordinance here was substantial in that the ordinance
prohibited something which the statute allowed and the fact that the
ordinance was upheld marks this as one of the more liberal decisions.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found no conflict between
a state statute limiting the length of endurance contests and a city
ordinance prohibiting them altogether.' 3 The court said that both
provisions could coexist and refused to invalidate the ordinance where
the difference was one only of detail. In a very recent liberal construc-
tion of a municipal ordinance, the Supreme Court of Missouri held
that a Kansas City ordinance requiring a physical examination for
barbers every six months did not conflict with a state statute requiring
a physical examination only once a year.
14
8 Ex Parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); Fremont v. Keating,
96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917); State v. Jaasted, 43 Ariz. 458, 32 P. (2d)
799 (1934) ; Peterson v. Chicago and Alton Ry., 265 Mo. 462, 178 S.W. 182 (1915);
Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
9 1 McQuillen, op. cit. supra, note 4, §194: "The consequence is there are no
well established rules or principles by which to determine what are municipal and
what are state affairs."
1o A large part of the difficulty in this field is caused by the fact that the courts
do not always clearly distinguish among these three separate grounds. In the
principal case the court discusses the inadequacy of the delegation as well as the
concept that the statute occupies the entire field. The opinion infers that the dele-
gation was construed as inadequate largely because the statute was meant to be
exclusive.
11 See comments (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 647; (1942) 28 Iowa L. Rev. 108.
12 People v. Commons, 64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 148 P. (2d) 724 (1944).
13 Fox v. Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 275 N.W. 513 (1937).
14 Vest v. Kansas City, -Mo.-, 194 S.W. (2d) 38 (1946).
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The opposite, more strict interpretation is found in cases with much
the same factual situations. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that an ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer and intoxicating liquors
after midnight was inconsistent with a state statute which prohibited
their sale after two-thirty in the morning.15 By prohibiting the sale
only after two-thirty, the court reasoned, the statute was impliedly
allowing it until that time and the ordinance which prohibited it after
midnight was therefore inconsistent and conflicting. In another case' 6
the state statute prohibited gambling in public and the ordinance was
a blanket regulation against gambling in general. The Alabama Court
of Appeals held that the statute, in prohibiting gambling in public, was
in effect permitting it in private, so that part of the ordinance which
was construed as being against gambling in private was conflicting and
void. Cases following this line of construction are legion.
17
The situation existing where a state statute and a similarly worded
ordinance vary only as to the severity of the penalty provided affords
a good example of the confusion surrounding the meanings of "conflict".
An Ohio appellate court held that an ordinance against disturbing the
peace which provided a fine of not exceeding $100 for its violation did
not conflict with a statute to the same effect which provided for a fine
of not more than $50.18 The court adhered to the familiar rule that
an ordinance is not void solely because it varies the penalty provided
by the statute, though it would conflict if it allowed that which the
statute prohibited.' 9 In Texas the court held that an ordinance which
provided a different penalty for a given offense than the Penal Code
did was thereby conflicting with it and void. 20 Numerous cases stand
on various intermediate grounds between these two findings, such as
that line which holds that an ordinance having more severe penalties
than the statute is valid where it is generally consistent with the stat-
ute's policy, but void if it is not.21
Many courts have phrased their decisions in these cases in terms of
whether or not the state statute was meant to be exclusive and thereby
occupy the entire legislative field. It is obvious from the above cases
that a court can, by holding that a state statute on the subject impliedly
permits everything it does not expressly forbid, find that a municipal
ordinance conflicts with these impliedly permitted acts, and thereby
accept a high standard of legislative prerogative. Conversely, by a
holding that a statute covers only the items specifically referred to
therein the municipality is left considerable leeway to legislate on those
subjects not covered. The principal case seems to be one of those best
15 Neil House Hotel v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E. (2d) 665
(1944).
16 Town of Boaz v. Jenkins, -Ala.-, 25 So. (2d) 394 (1946).
17 State v. Stallings, 189 N.C. 104, 126 S.E. 187 (1925); Seneiderman v. Sesan-
stein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929) ; In Re Porterfield, -Cal.-, 168 P. (2d)
706 (1946); Horwith v. City of Fresno, -Cal. App.-, 168 P, (2d) 767 (1946).
18 Village of Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 177, 176 N.E. 95 (1931).
19 Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Ill. 531, 105 N.E. 285 (1914) ; Ex Parte Daniels, 183
Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); Town of Livingston v. Scruggs, 18 Ala. App. 527,
93 So. 224 (1922).
20 City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 149 Tex. 40, 100 S.W. (2d) 695
(1936).
21 Ex Parte Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926) ; Keats v. Board of Police
Commissioners of Providence, 42 R.I. 240, 107 Atl. 74 (1919); Flynn v. Bledsoe Co.,
92 Cal. App. 145, Z67 Pac. 887 (1928).
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